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I. Introduction
Price negotiations in the livestock marketplaces in Somaliland are not
carried out openly. An exclusive circle of initiated and highly skilled
market insiders, the brokers, representing sellers and buyers, use a
tactile sign language to bargain. And, additionally, these negotiators
cover their signing hands with a shawl (cumaamad in Somali) in order
to hide the haggling from the curious glances of the bystanders. The
brokers, however, only strictly censor price figures, while they orally
and loudly substantiate their tactile signed offers by pinpointing the
qualities of the animal or herd under consideration.
This tactile hidden negotiation in the Somali livestock trade was
mentioned in a poem by Ismaaciil Mire, a well-known Somali poet
who lived in Togdheer region somewhere between the late 19th and
mid 20th century. Ismaaciil, criticized the practice and the dealings and
norms in the marketplace generally. He believed the livestock broker
who sold his livestock cheated him. Interestingly, until today criticism
did not fall silent. And, the contestation of the practice is not directed
to this particular way of negotiating exclusively. Some behaviours in
Somaliland’s livestock markets (seylado) are perceived as anti-norm.
Also, newcomers are excluded from the activities and are left in limbo
and darkness concerning the procedures in the trade.
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II. Literature Review
A. Silent Trade Practices.
Detailed descriptions of the hidden tactile price negotiation sign language in the Somali livestock markets are scarce. However, there is
a body of literature about similar phenomena on the African continent and the Arabian Peninsula. In this literature, silent or ‘dumb’
barter trade, is described abundantly.1 A good number of historians
and anthropologists (cf. the lists of important primary and secondary
sources, including Herodotus, Ibn Battuta, Grierson, Polanyi, etc., in
Bonner 2010) observed silent economic exchanges. For example, in
pre-colonial West Africa, foreign traders started barter with locals by
depositing goods at a specific place and then retreated and waited for
the latter to put down their articles, which they deemed of appropriate value, next to the items for exchange. Then the residents retreated,
and the foreigners revisited the barter place and either left it with the
offered goods or retreated again and waited for the locals to reconsider
their offer and top-up their deposition (Fage and Tordoff 2013, 46). This
kind of barter between groups with no shared language proceeded
without personal contact or oral communication, let alone direct price
negotiation by other means such as sign language. Importantly for our
case, this forum of exchange excluded rival traders from offering their
bid.
Moreover, academics expressed considerable doubt that this practice was actually performed in exactly this completely non-verbal way
ǻãȱ ŗşŝŚǰȱ řŖȮřŗǼǯȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȁȱ
trade’ can apply to a spectrum of transactions” (including different
ways of encounters and modes of non-verbal communication) and that
most likely often some kind of “local brokerage” was involved (Fage
and Tordoff 2013, 46; Hopkins 2014, 67; Bonner 2010, 37). Besides the
element of lack of transparency of the barter for competing market
participants, these rather vague and questionable accounts of the precolonial West African silent trade, are not very helpful for understanding the Somali hidden tactile negotiation sign language. In the latter
case, the negotiating parties share a common language and hail from
the same cultural background.
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B. Negotiating With Sign Language.
Bonner (2010) described a case study of the pre-Islamic Arabian way
of wrapping up a deal without verbal negotiation. This kind of silent
trade is in its procedure and geographically and (perhaps) culturally
much closer to our case of the Somali hidden tactile sign language
negotiation. About one kind of pre-Islamic silent trade, he writes:
In pre-Islamic Arabia, as reported in the tradition on the markets, one
method of concluding a sale was to do it non-verbally, with gestures,
murmuring, and touching, perhaps using a system of sign language
of which we have no further record. ‘Touching,’ ¬, here meant
touching the other person’s arm or tugging at his clothing, and did not
mean touching the object of sale. After the coming of Islam, there was a
recollection that ¬ used to involve a mutual touching of the parties during their negotiations. Soon, however, the original context—the
silence imposed on these transactions—became obscure, and all that
remained was a memory of the gesture of touching. (Bonner 2010, 32)

This corresponds to our case in various ways. Firstly, price negotiation
is non-verbal. Secondly, traders have developed an elaborate sign language for the sole and particular purpose of non-verbally negotiating
prices. Thirdly, the sign language, unlike deaf sign language, does not
function based on visual but on tactile codes—similar to deaf-blind
sign language. Fourthly, this tactile negotiation language was used
despite the fact that “in Arabia most market-goers spoke Arabic, and
for those who did not, some sort of lingua franca must have been available” (Bonner 2010, 37). Thus, it was not a necessity because there was
no shared language between the negotiating partners. Fifthly, the consequence of using this mode of negotiation excludes competitors from
offering their bid on the basis of knowledge of the price range negotiated in. However, what is different from our case is: Bonner assumes
that the “markets of the Arabs” were silent places, while Somaliland’s
livestock markets, the seylado, are not (as will be described in detail
below). Secondly, Bonner did not indicate that the tactile negotiation
was hidden, for example with a shawl covering the negotiating hands
as in our case. Hence, interestingly, the similarities of Bonner’s reconstructions from his primary text sources and our contemporary anthropological observations prevail. And, historically, Bonner’s description
might even offer a potential clue to reach at an explanatory hypothesis
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about the origin of the Somali hidden tactile negotiation: it could possibly date back to pre-Islamic trade networks between the Arabian
Peninsula and the Horn of Africa (Bonner 2010, 47). But that is an
assumption for others to test. Our goal is to describe, contextualize,
and develop an understanding for the reasons this kind of negotiation
practice is so solidly embedded in Somaliland’s livestock trade in the
past and today.
C. Accounts of the Somali ‘finger’ Negotiation Practice.
As we mentioned above, very little has been written about the Somali
hidden and tactile livestock negotiation practice. However, there are
numerous publications, academic and non-academic, about Somali
livestock markets that offer a macro-perspective. These publications
(e.g. Ciabarri 2010; Samatar, Salisbury, and Bascom 1988; Mugunieri
et al. 2008) describe the functioning of the market generally, in institutional, economic and also political terms, but mostly do not delve into
the market microcosm of norms and practices. The ‘finger’ negotiation
practice is mentioned, for example by Adam Ahmed Hussein, in his
article about the marketing of Somali livestock, as a “‘private treaty’
haggling between buyers and sellers” (Adam Ahmed Hussein 2016,
141), but not described in detail.
Other three examples of literature that contain slightly more
detailed accounts describe the practice in the mid 19th and early and
late 20th century. Richard Burton, the British explorer, described the
practice, as observed in Saylac in 1854, as follows:
The citizens have learned the Asiatic art of bargaining under a cloth.
Both parties sit opposite each other, holding hands: if the little finger for
instance be clasped, it means 6, 60, or 600 dollars, according to the value
of the article for sale; if the ring finger, 7, 70, or 700, and so on. (Burton
1894, 87)

Interestingly, he calls it the “Asiatic art of bargaining”–maybe he refers
to the above described ancient Arabian practices. Also, he was probably the first to describe the tactile codes in detail in English language.
Unlike today, he mentioned that the traders were seated.
Lorenz Hagenbeck, a German animal trader and zoo director,
describes in his autobiography the practice of Somalis in Djibouti
in January 1906. Hagenbeck placed an order for 1000 dromedaries
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which he had to supply “at top speed” to the German government for
their “defence forces in South-West Africa.” (Hagenbeck 1956, 65) He
described the trade as follows, emphasising the insider-outsider aspect
of the practice:
I could have been of no use in dromedary buying, for I had not mastered
the secret finger-language used in that trade. The following was the procedure. Hersy Egeh and the seller took each other’s hands and covered
them with a cloth. Thus they literally got into a huddle and, unseen by
any of the dromedary salesmen clustering round them, bargained away
unhindered to determine both fair price and Hersy’s share in it. It was all
done by a complicated system of finger pressure, and there was only one
man working with Carl Hagenbeck of Hamburg who knew all the tricks
of the East African dromedary trade, and that was Hersy Egeh. (Hagenbeck 1956, 69)

The historian Charles Geshekter, in this article about “Anti-Colonialism and Class Formation” in “The Eastern Horn of Africa before 1950”
briefly described how the dilaalin actually grab their fingers:
Among the Somalis, the procedures for exchanging animals involved an
intricate bargaining process that sometimes was hidden (literally and
figuratively) from nomadic producers. […] To commence the exchange,
the dilaals [italics in original] would grasp hands under a small cloth and
conduct a series of offers and counter-offers involving the assignment
of monetary values to each digit. The top digit equalled 100, the middle
one 200, and the third digit was worth 300. The prices were established
by alternatively grasping each other’s digits until an agreement was
reached and the two brokers then shook hands. (Geshekter 1985, 21–22)

D. Knowledge Gap.
This literature review yields two results. Firstly, the existing ‘silent
trade’ conceptualizations are not fruitfully applicable to the Somali
hidden tactile negotiation sign language practice. Secondly, there is
a gap in the literature about Somali livestock trade when it comes to
in-depth studies of the microcosm of the seylada, with its own norms
and practices. For this reason, this article aims to fill this gap by ethnographically describing and anthropologically interpreting the complex
system of norms and skilled practices, adopting a micro-perspective
lens. Additionally, our goal is also to contribute to the quite active
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current scholarly debate on the Somali livestock sector, by providing
a contemporary account of how the practice is embedded in the livestock marketplaces.
III. Methodology
The empirical data on which this analysis is based was gathered within
the framework of two PhD research projects. Ahmed examines the
post-war livestock economy in Somaliland. Raphael’s research project investigates the transformation of human-camel relations and the
accompanying changes of the skills of camel experts.
We separately conducted ethnographic observations and interviews
in three livestock markets, in Burco, Hargeysa and Wajaale, between
August 2016 and August 2018, and pooled our datasets after a joint
research stay, again in Burco in Eastern Somaliland’s Toghdeer region
from the end of July until early August 2018. Observations and informal interviews were carried out from early morning until noon, the
active hours of the market. More structured interviews were conducted
after the Asr prayers in the late afternoon.
IV. The Ecology of Somaliland’s Urban Livestock Markets
The hidden tactile price negotiation is only practiced in the one institution of Somaliland’s livestock market, the livestock marketplace called
seylada (singular of seylado). Marketplaces are spatially delineated
places within which a number of social actors engage in various kinds
of interactions and are connected by different relationships; all orchestrated by timeframes, practical routines or procedures, norms, rules
and regulations (cf. definition of marketplace in Bestor 2001, 9227–28).
In the following, the seylada will be described as a microcosm of complexly interwoven spatio-temporal, social, and normative dimensions
that surround the skilled negotiation practice.
A. The Spatial, Temporal, and Social Contours of Seylada.
Livestock markets are publicly accessible areas that are partly fenced
(brick-built, ironsheeted, or pricky shrub fences; they make herding
of the animals easier), dusty open-air spaces. Within the boundaries of
the marketplace, there are three (not physically) zoned areas for different animals and markets: the shoats (sheep and goats) for export (area
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name: ahmin), the shoats for the local meat market (dabaxaad, which is
organized by women) and the camels (geel). Located in the periphery
of these zones are the tea shops and kiosks where the market people
take a rest, drink tea, or eat breakfast in the shadow, sheltered from
sun, wind and dust. Apart from these simply constructed shacks, the
inanimate inventory further consists of shade-giving roofs (hosting the
shoats for local meat production market; laterally open), sand heap or
concrete loading ramps (digo), loading and unloading animal transport
lorries and passenger taxis or tuk-tuks, and Landcruisers of wealthier
traders. All three seylado look more or less the same, only differing in
their sizes and specialization on different animals. Also, we assume
their appearance did not change much over time.
The marketplace is brought to life in the early morning around five
when the tea shops start preparing breakfast for the arriving traders, brokers, and workers, while the first flocks of animals arrive by
foot or lorry. Then, camels and small ruminants are traded in Burco
and Hargeysa until noon, while cattle trading starts in Wajaale at 5:00
a.m. and usually ends already before 9:00 a.m. The seylado are busy
marketplaces in the morning and then turn into football fields in the
afternoon. All the markets are open every day, including the local official holiday Friday. Seasonally, the trade volumes change; the buzzing
season peaks during Arafa, the Hajj season.2 Other factors that influence the trade volume are droughts and import bans, such as the dire
period during and after the last drought in 2017 or Saudi import ban
periods.3
There are around 26 different types of actors. Among them, the
highly experienced traders and brokers (dilaalin; presented below)
stand in the centre of all activities in the marketplaces. The traders
(mainly in the export value chain) can be divided into jeeble, faashle and
shirkad.4 The shirkad (Arabic, literally ‘company’) are the traders who
work for exporters (to Saudi Arabia, specifically). The jeeble are traders who collect livestock from the rural areas (directly from livestock
owners or from so-called bush-markets) and sell it on to the shirkad.
The group of traders called faashle gathers and buys livestock brought
to the marketplace directly by producers and sell it on to the shirkad for
profit. Corresponding to these three types of traders, there are three
types of brokers, the jeeble broker, the faashle broker, and the shirkad
broker. The shirkad trader usually has a permanent broker, while the
jeeble and faashle employ brokers ad-hoc. Furthermore, there is permanent staff of the big export companies like counters and accountants,
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and a large group of ad-hoc employed labourers. These are porters
who help load and unload animals from and to lorries, herders who
group, regroup and keep together groups of animals that the brokers negotiate about, and herders who drive the animals from nearby
xerooyin (singular xero, kraals) where they are fed and kept overnight
when they are not sold immediately. There are also men who mark the
sold animals with the new owner’s (Ǽ sign with paint, lorry drivers, tea shop and kiosk operators, employees of the municipality who
collect the taxes (per head), and, of course, pastoralists (livestock producers) who bring their own animals directly or come to choose some
for rearing purposes. The non-human population of the marketplaces
consists of cattle, sheep, goats, camels.
B. The Dilaal.
The dilaal, the broker, mediates all the transactions and no transaction
is conducted without him or her. Thus, the brokers constitute an exclusive group of initiated and experienced individuals that specialize on
one specific set of marketplace tasks only. Female brokers can only
be found in the market section for the trade of animals for local meat
production. The dilaalin are employed by the aforementioned traders
or by the livestock producers directly. They are, as mentioned, the only
actors who engage, commissioned by the seller or buyer respectively
(the seller and buyer mostly neither meet nor know of each other), in
the price negotiation—for which they use the hidden tactile sign language. The seller and buyer usually select their brokers that are members of their own kin group.
There are brokers of all Somali kinship categories, from as far as
Ogaden, South- and Central-Somalia, represented in the marketplace,
especially in the market in Burco. There are market segregations; the
brokers of the different kin groups gather in different corners of the
market, depending on the direction from where the transporters,
producers, and traders of their kin enter the seylada. For example, in
Hargeisa, the east is dominated by Habaryonis, the south by Edagale,
and in the west by Sa’ad Muse. In Burco, the Habarjeclo and members of
kinship groups from South- and Central-Somalia dominate the northeast. Alternatively, the Habaryonis and Ogaden are located in the south.
However, in terms of access, there are no restrictions. Anyone can
enter and try making an effort to earn a living.
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Dilaalin are mostly men in their middle ages and usually hail from
rural areas and pastoral lifestyles before they migrated to the livestock
market towns. Or they previously worked in the local meat business.
Senior dilaalin have double roles; they also work as wakiil (agents) for
the jeeble of their kin.
During the market hours, they appear as rough-looking men with
rugged clothes. Many wear a macawis (wrap skirt) and sandals. Their
accessories include a cimaadmad (turban) and/or a shaal (shawl), one
of which they use to cover up the negotiating hands; a budh (club) or
bakoorad (walking stick), which they use to keep the livestock together
and sometimes to defend themselves in the case of a conflict; some put
on koofiyad (prayer cap) to protect themselves from the sun and also
to look trustworthy; a small notebook and a pen to record their deals;
and most of them wear a (vintage) CASIO digital watch with a steel
bracelet.
Their habitus, both physical look and behaviour, changes completely when they leave the market. In the afternoon, they put on
closed shoes and clean clothes, move with notebooks and pen and start
doing the xisaab (math) after Asr prayers (that is, after they take a rest
between the midday Dhur and the mid-afternoon Asr prayers). Doing
the math means collecting money from buyers (the traders, local meat
production business people, and pastoralists replenishing their herds
with dhaqmaad5 animals), deducting fees and expenditures, delivering
the money to the respective seller broker, and paying the seller (traders
or local pastoralists).
The broker himself calculates his share, which is based on a perhead remuneration (0.4-0.5 USD per head of goat or sheep; 10-20 USD
per camel; received from either the buyer or seller depending on his
role as buyer or seller broker). Broker assistants receive the qorax joog
(literally: standing under the sun) fee, a kind of a tip from the buyer
for the efforts in the morning (lump sum of 3-5 USD, depending on
the number of traded camels). Further cuts that are made from either
the buyer’s or seller’s capital are the debts owed to service providers.
These are the livestock transporters (lorries or human trekkers), the
herders that keep and feed the arriving animals outside town before
they are taken to the market and sold, porters in the market who help
with unloading from lorries, and the herders within the marketplace
that keep the flocks of sheep and goats together. The latter receive
the so-called gees qaarac (literally: hitting horns) fee from the seller.
Lastly, the brokers also handle the tax payments to the municipality
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that presides over the livestock market. Many of the seller traders
do not return to the rural areas with cash but with consumer goods
(sugar, rice, wheat flour, etc.) from the town’s stores which they resell in villages. The brokers also have to clear these debts. All of these
transactions are made in cash in the afternoon (no cash is brought to
the market in the morning)6, dollars for ahmin and Somaliland shillings
for dabaxaad livestock, and the brokers communicate with the debtors
and creditors via mobile phones. Because the brokers do not have
permanent offices, they conduct their afternoon tasks from backrooms
of stores or hotel rooms (where the out-of-town traders lodge), where
they comfortably sit on carpets, backs against big pillows, and sip tea.
Others sit in places where they can chew qat, a mild stimulant narcotic,
and smoke cigarettes. Among the countless phone calls are also inquiries from potential future clients from Somaliland, Puntland, Somalia,
and Ethiopia,7 who want to know about the state of the market, prices,
and logistics in order to make informed economic decisions.
C. Behaviours, Norms, and Anti-norms.
During the hectic morning hours of the marketplace, the employed
labourers and herders carry out their duties loudly by singing work
songs and shouting commands and hitting the animals with their
sticks. The traders and brokers engage in constant chatter in order to
receive market information. Although the brokers silence the figures,
they argue loudly and quarrel to underpin their claims while negotiating.
The brokers behave aggressively. They threaten each other with
their sticks, hurl slanders to each other (even to women, elderly, or
religious men!), and shower abuses on men and animals around them.
Some easily lose their temper while others at least act as if they are
about to lose it in order to assure the opposing broker registers one’s
seriousness. The Dilaalin quarrel and fight about who got commissioned to sell or buy livestock for a trader and who can legitimately
claim the commission fee.
This rough, noisy, and fast atmosphere infects everyone within the
perimeter of the marketplace. In order to compete in this atmosphere,
one has to adjust accordingly by acting aggressively. This behaviour
side-lines elderly men, most women, and pious men and women,
because they do not want to act according to this norm.
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Apart from the generally high volume of oral communication of
Somalilanders in public spaces, these behaviours in the market, like
the quarrelling and insulting, distinctively go against common public
etiquette of interaction. It is somehow an antithesis to the atmosphere
and norms of behaviour outside the boundaries of the market. Outside
of it, the culturally and religiously defined etiquette guiding interaction insists on respectfulness of the elderly and women and addressing
somebody with flattering titles (Hajji8, brother, cousin, uncle, friend
…), and general kindness with a touch of humour.
Thus, the hidden livestock price negotiation, accompanied by the
loud argument, stands exemplary for a body of transgressive behaviours that are embedded and exclusively tolerated within the market.
The traits of this negotiation practice can be seen as central and hence
representative for the dynamics of the market generally. These are
typical for all the other market-specific modes of interaction and its
subcultural etiquette—which is contrarian to the norms outside of the
market. The market therefore constitutes an arena in which behaviours
and social norms, anti-norms, prevail that are sanctioned elsewhere.
The seylado are microcosms, in which a group of actors dominate the
activities by exhibiting behaviours that are exclusively tolerated in
their subculture. Here, no one is held accountable for slanders or verbal insults. Because this has become the norm, for outsiders to try to
tame the marketplace people has proven fruitless (despite the outspoken criticism, see below). Thus, the market is a contact-zone that is
reigned over by initiated and skilled insider actors who fiercely defend
their norms and codes despite criticism of the outsiders and the general transformation of the livestock trade. After the lunch break, the
brokers do not only appear with a different look but also a different
behaviour. They break with their market habitus completely; they are
relaxed and put on friendly faces.
D. The Hidden Tactile Sign Language Price Negotiation.
With the description of the context of the marketplace, the seylada, we
move on to describe the actual practice that is the main purpose of the
article.
When livestock arrives in the market, driven by herders or unloaded
from trucks, brokers gather around the animals curiously. That is when
they start assessing the worth of the animals. The quality assessment
is standardized with a grading system. Due to this collating of ani-
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mals into the grading system and the availability of the current market
prices for each grade (due to market chatter), the attending brokers
already share a similar asking price range.
When the first buyer broker approaches the seller broker, the
onlookers curiously follow the argument between the negotiating parties. After a while, more and more are drawn to the site, and they
gather around the livestock which is standing in the middle in a circle.
The bystanders include lower-level brokers who also assist in keeping the livestock together and then claim a small reward for it. They
mainly make claims on livestock owned and sold by a trader from
their kin. Sometimes, there are spies of rival shirkad traders among the
onlookers. Such is the scene in which the negotiating brokers hide the
prices over which they haggle. After grabbing each other’s right hand,
they immediately cover them, from one’s mid-underarm to the other’s,
with a piece of fabric, mostly turban or shawl cloths.
Once their hands are covered, the buyer broker makes his
first offer. The figures are tacitly and tactually signed by swiftly and
skilfully grabbing either a specific number of fingers, by pressing
the knuckles or bending the distal phalanges of specific fingers. The
offered price, thus, is signed digit by digit.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

grabbing of index finger
grabbing of index finger and middle finger
grabbing of index finger, middle finger and ring finger
grabbing of index finger, middle finger, ring finger
and little finger
grabbing all fingers
pressing the knuckle of the little finger
pressing knuckle of the ring finger
pressing knuckle of the middle finger
bending distal phalanges of the index finger to the inside
pressing knuckle of index finger

The initiated negotiating partners are both always aware in which
price range they are negotiating, thus, there is no confusion about the
numbers. That is also why there is no tactile sign to separate decimals
(67.5 is signed as 675). The difference between the initial offers of the
two sides amounts perhaps to a maximum 50 USD for camels and less
than 10 USD for shoats.
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While the brokers are signing figures, as mentioned above, they talk
about the qualities of the animals loudly. For example, they praise a
camel’s constitution, highlight the thick layer of meat over the ribs, or
the buyer broker might point out the less positive traits of the animal
to lower the value. The conversation can be heated but also humorous–
sometimes they both crack insider jokes. In this manner, the negotiation round is a quickly concluded process. The experienced brokers
have developed their tactile sign language skills at the beginning of
their career and master it to perfection. Weighing up and calculating
offers is delegated to their hands and fingers as the receiving and sending entities of meaningful—in numeric and emotional terms—codes.
Cogitating is embodied.
A broker who wants to express that he insists on a figure does this
by not letting slip the other’s hand—he fixates the figure he wants with
a hard grip. It is not common that the negotiators agree in their first
attempt, which takes an average of 30 seconds. So, they part and repeat
the procedure again later, sometimes several times. When no deal is
struck but they are still desperate to get one done, an isku soo jiide (a
mediator broker) intervenes. He grabs the hand of the seller broker,
covers their hands, and then tries to finish the deal for the unsuccessful buyer broker. But first, he is informed about the shirkad (buying)
broker’s offer, also via covered hands. Then, he, while hidden, grabs
hands with the jeeble (seller) broker to find out how much his offer is.
At that moment, he proposes a new price. If still no agreement could
be reached, the livestock is moved from the area of the market where
the shirkad (buying) broker makes his offers to another rival shirkad
where the process starts afresh. In the whole undertaking, the bystanders, other brokers and professional outsiders, are never informed about
the negotiated figures.
When two brokers finally agree on a figure, they confirm the deal
with a hefty powerful handshake. Some seal and celebrate the deal
with a hearty “Bismillah” (Arabic, in the name of God)ǯȱ After this,
the livestock (in the case of shoats) is moved in line and counted, the
shirkad broker and his assistants inspect all the bought animals again.
In case they find ill ones, they remove them from the purchased flock
and price them differently. The negotiated price always only concerns
one animal representing a specific grade (for camels). Later, it is multiplied by the actually chosen number of animals. As an exception, the
price negotiation over large numbers of export shoats (sold by a jeeble
to a shirkad trader) is not based on individual heads but a whole herd,
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despite the different qualities of animals in it. Lastly, the seller broker
usually confirms the price with the seller, the previous owner, and
then lets the buyer broker know about the final decision. The buyer
brokers (especially the shirkad) are mostly equipped with the authority
of their commissioners to act autonomously.
E. Rationales for Adherence to and Criticism of the Practice.
A uniform and satisfactorily enlightening rationale for this practice
is hard to come by. Various actors explain, defend, or criticise this
at once ritualistic, theatrical, and hidden negotiation very differently.
Additionally, it is a sensitive topic that few brokers like to discuss with
outsiders openly. This is also due to the many critiques of the practice.
Most of the brokers claim that they adhere to the practice because it
is caado, traditional custom. Asked about the consequence of the lack
of transparency of prices, they argue that it is done in the best interest for the organization of the market and economic benefits for all
its participants. Firstly, concerning the organisation of the market, it
enables brokers to strike deals more quickly without interference from
the bystanders who could, if not hidden and silent, make theirs bids
as well. As a result, more bargains can be closed uninterrupted. Secondly, concerning the economic benefactors, they artlessly explain that
the practice allows for different prices for animals of the same quality. Hence, both seller and buyer, or seller broker and buyer broker,
can potentially gain a better profit then his competitors. Also, traders
can re-sell animals immediately after purchase for a higher price to
another bidder, without the latter knowing of the initial price. Lastly,
the broker potentially profits from the higher total number sold, as he
rakes in a per head commission fee.
Still, we believe that we do not yet fully understand all the effects
of the practice for different actors. We assume that the censorship definitely disadvantages outsiders or non-initiated newcomers (e.g. pastoral livestock producers and new brokers) in the market, as they are
not able to assess the animals’ worth and thus cannot estimate the
narrow price range within the experienced insider brokers negotiate.
So, they are side-lined in a way or at least they risk selling below or
buying above the insider prices. Thus, the hiding, the deliberate lack of
transparency as a norm of the market, can be interpreted as a strategy
for the brokers and their exclusive circle to protect their business and
livelihoods.
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One line of critique of the practice comes in the form of an accusation that the brokers are insincere or even blatant cheaters. As a matter
of fact, they call them “thieves” and interpret the hidden negotiation
as “robbery.” The oldest source of critique is contained in a poem
composed by the renowned Somali poet, Ismaaciil Mire, and an acute
admirer of camels. Mire was born in the second half of the 19th century
and died in 1950. In that poem, titled ‘Ooggii Horaynagu Keceen’9 (‘With
the glow of dawn they came upon us’), he describes his background
and his first visit to a livestock market, the one in Burco. There, he was
caught off-guard by what he described as the “faithless” and “greedy”
brokers. He did not understand their way of business and the money
economy in general. Eventually, he left with a selling price, which he
deemed unworthy. He was upset over the transaction conducted by
the brokers.
Oh my wife, going back to my early ancestors
They and I have never seen trade with money
The men we are descended from used to have camels
It was always my lot to get a share from the attacking campaigns
Only once did I do something which my father did not do
I took four nights to reach the village, which the camels were
loaded up for
I reached the gate of Burco, I and my goods
Immediately they approached as if they were ready for me
With the glow of dawn they came upon us, the brokers of the
sheep and goats
People whose good faith had been taken away gathered conspiratorially
against us
I was astonished when they pressed the shoulders of the rams
“It is that amount; no it isn’t” they argued bluntly
The stubborn arguing disheartened me greatly
The one with the twisted eye cheated me, the one whom I trusted
They tried to console me with four shillings minus forty cents (4 annas)
While I watched the hands with which I was bought
The sheep and goats you are asking me about have fallen into
the hands of others
Those whom I believe deserve to be hung from thorns by their
Achilles tendon
That whip-like stick and the pieces of cloth they forgot near me
Some men are more expert in process than me; ask them!
(Ismaaciil Mire 2009, translated by Martin Orwin)
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Confronted with these accusations, the brokers reply that they do not
cheat because of the risk for their reputation. Buyer and seller might
meet each other and find out that the amount that one received differs
considerably from what the other one paid. Reputation and trust are
the most important ingredients for a successful broker carrier, they say.
Otherwise, no one would engage them anymore.
The second line of critique is religiously motivated. Some critics say
that the practice is “against our religion” or “haram.” There are two
points of criticism here. The first concerns the relationship between the
sexes in the marketplace. It happens, albeit rarely, that a female and
a male broker engage directly in negotiations with each other. Some
people are indignant at seeing unrelated men and women exchange
handshakes. That is why many female brokers conduct their negotiations with male brokers in “side meetings.” They move away from the
crowd and negotiate orally but quietly so that nobody can hear the
prices discussed.
The second point of criticism concerns transparency. Quranic verses
and stories of the Hadith about this matter are interpreted as follows:
“Business and work in general have to rest on ethical and moral foundations. The precondition for propagating and realizing this goal is
transparency” (Ali and Al Owaihan 2008, 12). Interestingly, critics of
trading practices that lack transparency already referred to silent negotiation practices, voiced in their concern in the early days of Islam.
Bonner writie:
When Islam arrived, the memory of these old Arabian markets became
negative and vague. For the disapproving Muslim jurists, the pre-Islamic
marketplace provided the perfect example of gharar, the indeterminate
or aleatory element that renders a transaction void and reprehensible.
We can see now that the Muslim jurists were not being merely dogmatic and close-minded on this point. For trading in pre-Islamic Arabia did sometimes take place in conditions which resemble games of
chance–conditions which were roundly condemned in the Quran and
early Islam. (Bonner 2010, 46)

V. Conclusion
In order to conceptually frame the hidden tactile livestock price negotiation practice, we would like to borrow from ‘classic’ conceptions in
the sociology of markets. In this academic subfield, markets are arenas
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of social interaction and considered central institutions of capitalist
economies (Beckert 2009, 245). After the collapse of communism, markets have become places of coordination and exchange of complex
capitalist economy (opposite planned economy) (Lie 1997, 341). For a
long time, modern economists theorized on the basis of the assumption that economic actors in the markets act rationally, are self-centred,
and base their decisions on a freely accessible corpus of information
(Beckert 2009, 246; Granovetter 1985, 485). However, during the second half of the 20th century, a new generation of sociologically trained
economists questioned the basic premise of the rationality of economic
actor’s actions and the assumption of independence from local behaviours and institutions. This has created sustained debate between “formalists” and “substantivists” on the independence of markets from
the sociocultural contexts and institutions (Geertz 1978, 28). The most
important concept that emerged from the debate was the concept of
“embeddedness” (Narotzky 2001, 4069). Embeddedness, inspired by
Karl Polaynyi, is based on the assumption that contextual behaviours
and notions such as trust, and institutions influence and sustain local
economies (Lie 1997, 349). In this conclusion, we will try to explain
the phenomenon at hand by borrowing this embeddedness concept. It
guided our analysis of the organization of Somaliland’s livestock markets and the context specific practices and strategies employed by the
market’s actors.
Livestock trade in Somaliland started in the pre-colonial period,
way back before the modern central state institutions were introduced. Since the pre-colonial period, the livestock traders invented
and transferred indigenous knowledge from generation to generation. These skilled trade practices give livestock traders a competitive
advantage, for example, by maintaining trade relationships over time
and because of its neat and functional interconnection with all aspects
of society. After the introduction of modern central state institutions,
starting from the colonial administration, livestock trade was always
conducted in the periphery and was largely governed by informal and
indigenous practices and norms. Thus, analysing Somaliland’s livestock trade organisation using a neoclassical lens may yield no substantial revelation. An analysis based on embeddedness of traditional
practices however is likely to offer new discernments which can be
useful in understanding post-war and developing economies.
The literature has provided an insight into the long history of a
skilled practice and embodied cognition that in today’s world might
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seem outlandish and out-dated to many observers. The existing texts
on silent trading and sign language negotiation show how these practices have and still do create connections and how they maintain the
functionality of and social order in marketplaces—over time and
against all odds, such as language barriers or socio-political and economic transformations of the market and its surroundings.
We argue that hidden tactile livestock price negotiation sign language is embedded in the marketplace. Firstly, we located the practice
in the spatial and temporal contours of the seylada. Secondly, we tried
to connect it to the main actors, who skillfully embodied their negotiation cognition, and the normative framework within which they
interact. We acknowledged both the brokers’ and critics’ explanations
for their reasons for adhering to their ways or for their disgruntlement
respectively. This helped to illustrate how the practice is interlinked
with social and cultural, including religious, dynamics in Somaliland. The fact that the practice survived for a long time and that it is
negotiated over and again, as the history of criticism depicts, demonstrates the embeddedness of the practice in Somaliland’s social fabric.10
The practice is a ritual that carries cultural meaning and therefore is
trusted, and the brokers are trustworthy cultural figures. Furthermore,
the marketplace is politically embedded: on one hand, state bureaucratic interventions in the market are reduced to taxation only; on
the other hand, it is strongly connected to the kinship system and the
pastoral political economy. We assume that this political entanglement
assures, as already mentioned above, the reproduction of this system.
Lastly, the protection of a functioning system of organizing the market,
is in the best interest of the whole society of Somaliland–considering
that the export of livestock is one of the few sources of foreign currency of the country, and the domestic trade of animals is economically
very important as well. However, we have to state that we cannot draw
any conclusion about the question whether the market could be run
more profitably without this practice.
Notes
1. Many people inhabiting today’s globalized world have made similar experiences in
their life when they encountered traders with whom no language is shared, and we
therefore negotiate with hands or, often seen today, by typing offers and counter-offers
into hand calculators or mobile phone displays.
2. Saudi importers buy millions of shoats in the Hajj season because each pilgrim should
slaughter an animal on the Hajj. The slaughtered animals, however, are then often not
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eaten in Saudi Arabia but are shipped out to poorer Muslim countries around the world
after slaughtering.
3. Currently the import of camels from Somaliland into Saudi Arabia and Egypt are
banned. These import bans are bypassed by exporting Somali livestock from the port in
neighbouring Djibouti.
4. Generally, these marketplaces host two different value chains. The export and the
local meat production trade. The actors in these two differ slightly.
5. Animals not for export or slaughter
6. Some local buyers use the mobile money system Zaad to pay parts of the agreed price
as an advance to make transactions of large sums–these cannot be handled with the
inflation plagued Somaliland shilling as the volume of cash bundles would be too big
and heavy.
7. Livestock from all these regions are traded in Somaliland because of Somaliland’s
Berbera port’s geostrategic position, only a few shipping hours away from the ultimate
buyers in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, or Oman.
8. Title of a person who has done the Hajj to Mecca, sometimes just flatterig
9. Also known under the title ‘Ibsi Lacageed’, which loosely translated means ‘buying
with cash.’
10. In the wider region, however, a co-existence of different price negotiation practices
in Somali livestock markets can be observed. In the Somali-inhabited northeastern part
of Ethiopia, for example, the hidden tactile price negotiation sign language was replaced
by transparent practices, using boards listing current prices. We authors assume that in
the process of regional integration, this non-synchronicity of trading practice will effect
is more contestation in this regard as well.
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